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HOW THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT
SAVED THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Richard Primus*†

INTRODUCTION
For all the drama surrounding the Commerce Clause challenge to the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“PPACA”), 1 the doctrinal question presented is simple. Under existing
doctrine, the provision is as valid as can be. To be sure, the Supreme Court
could alter existing doctrine, and many interesting things could be written
about the dynamics that sometimes prompt judges to strike out in new directions under the pressures of cases like this one. But it is not my intention to
pursue that possibility here. My own suspicion, for what it is worth, is that
the Supreme Court will abide by its previously announced doctrines and
uphold the individual mandate. So I mean to engage U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services v. Florida as the easy case it is and to explore
an underappreciated feature of how it came to be so easy.
My focus is the role of United States v. Lopez, in which the Supreme
Court famously struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond Congress’s power to enact under the Commerce Clause. 2 In the
conventional telling, Lopez (along with its sidekick, United States v. Morrison 3) is the source of the doctrinal threat to the PPACA’s individual
mandate. Before Lopez, the Supreme Court had settled into the practice of
upholding pretty much anything that Congress claimed to be within its
commerce power, largely on the strength of the econometrically undeniable
proposition that every law that does anything (or at least every law that does
anything to a lot of people) has effects on interstate commerce. But for
Lopez, the conventional view therefore runs, we would live for practical
purposes in a world of plenary federal power. Courts would not take Commerce Clause challenges seriously, and any attack on the PPACA would
have to be mounted on other grounds.
I think this conventional telling may be backwards. That is, I think it
nearer the truth to say that Lopez may be the PPACA’s salvation—that without Lopez, the individual mandate would be considerably more precarious.
*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Jessica Morton
and Samuel Rudman.
† Suggested citation: Richard Primus, Commentary, How the Gun-Free School Zones
Act Saved the Individual Mandate, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44 (2012),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/primus.pdf.
1. Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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I say this not because Lopez announced some rule that creates a safe harbor for the individual mandate. On its face, Commerce Clause doctrine
was obviously more favorable to federal regulation on the day before Lopez
was decided than on the day after. I say it instead for two other reasons, one
practical and one discursive.
The practical reason is located in the common law dynamics of Supreme
Court decisionmaking. Lopez announced limits on the commerce power, but
it also forced the Court in later cases to articulate rules that would limit
those limits. Without Lopez there would be no Gonzales v. Raich, 4 and it is
Raich that makes upholding the individual mandate so blisteringly easy as a
matter of doctrine.
Then there is the discursive reason. As a matter of the dynamics of
American constitutional discourse, the Supreme Court feels pulled to show
respect for the maxim that the federal government is one of limited and
enumerated powers. But having demonstrated that respect in Lopez (and
Morrison), it need not do so again and again and again: Lopez (and Morrison) may be enough to let the Court look itself in the eye as it recites the
maxim, and that may be all that is necessary. On the other hand, if the modern Court had not yet demonstrated that it takes the enumerated powers
maxim seriously, the urge to do so now might be irresistible.
In what follows, I will first explain why the individual mandate is within
Congress’s Article I power under existing doctrine. That will happen quickly. As I’ve said, the question is pretty easy, and there is no need to tarry over
it. I will then move to something a bit more subtle: the idea that Lopez has
made the world safe for the PPACA.
I.
Here, in four sentences that would be uncontroversial if health insurance
reform were not a divisive political issue, is the explanation of why enacting
the individual mandate is within Congress’s power. (1) Congress has the
power to regulate interstate commerce, including the power to regulate economic activities with substantial effects on interstate commerce. 5 (2) The
health insurance market is either an interstate commercial market or, at the
very least, a market with massive effects on interstate commerce. (3) When
Congress uses its commerce power to regulate with a comprehensive legal
scheme, it may under the Necessary and Proper Clause make rules for
things that are themselves neither interstate nor commercial, if those rules
are necessary for effecting the policy of the regulatory scheme overall. 6 (4)
The PPACA regulates the health insurance market comprehensively, and the
individual mandate is necessary for making that comprehensive regulatory
scheme work.

4.
5.
6.

545 U.S. 1 (2004).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18; id. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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That’s pretty much it. If there are remaining niceties, they have been thoroughly addressed in opinions by Judges Lawrence Silberman and Jeffrey
Sutton. 7 To be sure, the individual mandate is enormously controversial as a
political matter, and we have all observed that certain kinds of political controversy get articulated in the language of constitutional objection. Indeed,
such objections are sometimes felt powerfully enough among the
decisionmaking class as to prompt a change in constitutional doctrine. This
is a basic dynamic of living constitutionalism. But if the question before us
is how settled constitutional law bears on the individual mandate, we need
say no more. As John Marshall almost put the point, whether the PPACA’s
individual mandate provision is within Congress’s commerce power “is a
question deeply interesting to the United States,” but it is “not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.” 8
II.
What is intricate as well as interesting, I think, is the set of forces that
have made this much-anticipated decision so doctrinally easy. My focus is
on the role of Lopez—a decision that I see as a critical step toward upholding the individual mandate. That may seem unorthodox, given that Lopez
represents the contemporary Court’s commitment to putting limits on the
commerce power. But fans of the individual mandate are deeply fortunate
that Lopez was decided as it was. As noted above, there are two reasons
why, one rooted in the common law process of Supreme Court
decisionmaking and one located in the dynamics of American constitutional
discourse.
A. Common Law Process
Lopez imposed limits on the commerce power for the first time in decades. But Lopez did not undo all of the ways in which the world changed
during those decades, and the Court has not been so impractical or so ideologically blinkered as to think that it can fully turn back the clock. Instead,
the Court has recognized that we live now under conditions of pervasive
federal regulation, much of which it would be foolish to eliminate. Once
Lopez was on the books, therefore, its holding forced the Court to engage
seriously with the question of how constitutional law could impose a limit
on the commerce power while still permitting the elaborate edifice of federal law that keeps modern America running. That engagement took the form
of normal common law development: here a case limiting a principle that
should not be too far extended, there a case refining a rule that was stated
too crudely before.

7. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549–66 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part).
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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The high moment of this process to date has been Gonzales v. Raich, in
which the Court upheld a provision of the federal Controlled Substances Act
as applied to an individual citizen growing marijuana for his own noncommercial use. Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Raich stands as one of the
most cogent expositions of the commerce power ever written. With its clearsighted view of the difference (and interaction) between the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia’s opinion credibly explains both the impermissibility of far-flung, scattershot federal laws
like the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the validity of the comprehensive
federal regulatory schemes on which the modern American economy now
depends. The Commerce Clause itself, the opinion teaches, reaches only
interstate commerce, defined in terms of the three categories—channels,
instrumentalities, and substantial effects—that Lopez deems regulable. 9 But
when Congress enacts a regulatory scheme whose object lies within those
categories, its chosen implementation may also reach beyond those categories. If need be, it may reach into space that is neither interstate nor
commercial, so long as the implementing regulation is an integral part of the
overall scheme authorized by the commerce power.
It is Raich, therefore, that makes upholding the individual mandate so
straightforward. In my earlier four-sentence explanation of the validity of
the individual mandate, sentence (3) and perhaps also sentence (4) owe not
just their authority but also their crisp formulation to Raich, and in particular
to Justice Scalia’s analysis in that case. Without Raich, the Supreme Court
would approach the PPACA and individual mandate without the benefit of a
prominent, well-articulated, ready-to-hand framework explaining that otherwise ultra vires congressional action can be unproblematically within
Congress’s power if it is an integral part of a larger legal scheme regulating
interstate commerce.
To be sure, there is no conceptual reason why that framework had to be
articulated in Raich rather than awaiting articulation in Department of
Health and Human Services. Either set of facts would make it appropriate
for the deciding Court to explain that a challenged provision that by itself
might not regulate interstate commerce is valid if part of a larger system that
does regulate interstate commerce. But as observers of common law development know, not every case is an equally likely occasion for every possible
doctrinal development. Principles are refined when refinement is needed,
and whether a refinement is needed is something that the particular court
applying the doctrine decides. When faced with the alternative of undermining congressional drug policy and permitting Angel Raich to grow his
marijuana, the Rehnquist Court was moved to refine its doctrine and allow
federal law to stand. It is far less clear that the Roberts Court would feel the
need to refine doctrine in order to sustain the individual mandate.
So: Without Raich, the Court would lack a framework that cogently explains why permitting the individual mandate to stand does not mean
permitting Congress to do anything it likes. And Raich as we know it came
9.

Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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into being because of Lopez (and Morrison). Without Lopez (and Morrison),
the justices would not have needed to articulate any complex or refined theory in order to uphold a portion of the Controlled Substances Act.
To be sure, it is also true that without Lopez (and Morrison) the Court
could not strike down the individual mandate on the authority of Lopez (or
Morrison). But the problem that sank the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
Lopez would still be deployed against the individual mandate, even if Lopez
had never been decided. The party challenging the statute would contend
that to permit this federal law is to say that the Commerce Clause authorizes
anything, and that just cannot be. Without Raich, the justices might not have
already formulated (and committed to writing) the insight that permitting a
rule as part of a general regulatory scheme is not the same as permitting any
rule at all. Unless the justices were willing to work to find that answer with
the PPACA before them, the individual mandate would fall. And it is not
clear that the Roberts Court would see the incipient death of the individual
mandate as a sign that something was going wrong, such that doctrinal refinement would be necessary to set things right.
B. The Dynamics of Constitutional Discourse
As part of their socialization into the world of American constitutional
law, lawyers learn the maxim that the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers. For a long portion of the twentieth century, expert
observers could be forgiven for wondering whether that maxim had remaining force. But the maxim never disappeared: it was never consigned to the
dustbin of constitutional expressions. It stayed around, repeated from teacher to student as a living idea. Even most supporters of strong federal power
were loath to jettison the enumerated powers maxim as a matter of principle.
At no point in our post-1937 history does one find judges or law professors
routinely or ordinarily contending that the federal government has plenary
power. To be sure, many people felt that the federal government had something close to plenary power in practice, such that the maxim that the federal
government is one of limited and enumerated powers was essentially a nostrum devoid of meaningful present content. But for a great many wellsocialized American lawyers—perhaps enough to claim the mainstream of
constitutional discourse—the phrase “our federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers” was always one that induced head-nodding, at
least as a matter of principle.
To utter this maxim is to engage in a profession of faith. For many
American lawyers, declaring that the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers is a way of showing fidelity to the Founders’ design, to American tradition, to the structure of the document, and perhaps to
their own experience of induction into the discipline of constitutional law.
To disavow the maxim officially would be to break faith along all of these
dimensions. Constitutional law has tolerated tremendous expansions of federal power in practice, as the logic of modern life has directed. But it has
proved easier to tolerate those expansions while continuing to pay homage
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to the maxim than to repudiate the maxim openly. A piece of our identity is
invested in the maxim: articulating it reminds us of a part of who we are, or
of a story in which we locate ourselves.
Lopez was decided as it was partly because a majority of the Court felt
that it could not uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act and still utter the
maxim. At oral argument in the case, the Solicitor General of the United
States was asked to identify a law that the federal government could not
make if the statute at issue were upheld. He could not provide an example. 10
In the absence of such an example, and once the question had been asked,
those justices most concerned with limiting federal power (or keeping faith
with certain inherited maxims) could surely have felt that upholding the
Gun-Free School Zones Act would have made the hallowed phrase unsayable. Seen in this light, the Court’s decision in Lopez was partly a
compulsory demonstration of bona fides. If you really believe in this maxim, the contention ran—and of course you do—then there can be no
justification for your upholding the statute. Or put the other way, if you uphold the statute, you will be forever estopped from claiming that you honor
this traditional maxim. You will be, to that extent, a heretic. And if you are
supposed to be the guardian of the principles at whose articulation wellsocialized constitutional lawyers nod their heads, a heretic is an uncomfortable thing to be.
That said, the maxim does not demand that the Supreme Court constantly strike down federal laws. It demands only evidence that it is taken
seriously. Lopez and Morrison insulate the Court against charges of heresy
on the point—not perfectly, but considerably more than would be the case
had those decisions not been rendered. In later cases, the Court can uphold
far-reaching exercises of the commerce power without laying itself as open
to the claim that it has let the maxim come to nothing. 11 When it upholds
other federal statutes, the Court can identify concrete examples of laws that
are beyond the commerce power, laws with respect to which it has exercised
its solemn duty to police the boundaries of federal legislative power. 12 So
when it upholds other laws as within the commerce power, it can adduce
evidence that it has not left the maxim empty.
Now imagine the counterfactual world in which the Gun-Free School
Zones Act had not come before the Supreme Court. The Court’s case law
would not include Lopez’s demonstration of fidelity. For simplicity’s sake,
assume also that there was no Morrison. To those justices for whom it matters, the anxiety that the enumerated powers maxim has been abandoned
would be more potent than it is today, and the payoff for holding some law
to be beyond the commerce power would be commensurately greater. So if
the PPACA and its individual mandate were to come before a Court that had
10. Oral Argument at 4:52, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260#argument.
11. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
12. See e.g., id. at 1963 (citing Lopez, 516 U.S. at 567); Raich, 514 U.S. at 23 (citing
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549).
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not yet stood up for the maxim, several justices might experience a deeply
powerful pull toward demonstrating fidelity to the maxim, especially in light
of the public salience of the decision. With no Raich framework on the
books, the doctrinal path to that demonstration of fidelity would be easier
than the one that now exists. And one need not be a crude attitudinalist to
think that this Court would need less than overwhelmingly favorable conditions to be convinced to rule against the PPACA.
CONCLUSION
My argument has been both anticipatory and speculative. If the Court
strikes down the individual mandate, my thoughts here may come to seem
quaint or benighted or naïve. And even if the Court upholds the mandate, as
I expect it to do, I will not be able to prove what would have happened in a
world without the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Not knowing the contents of
other people’s minds, I can make no conclusive statements about the extent
to which the dynamics I have described operate, consciously or unconsciously, within the decisionmaking process of any given justice. This is
particularly true of my claims about the role of the enumerated powers maxim in American constitutional discourse. Nonetheless, the thought
experiment I have rehearsed has value in thinking about the dynamics of
American constitutional law. Among other things, it makes the point that the
alternative to the world of Lopez is probably not a world where the federal
judiciary merrily dispensed with any impulse to honor the idea of limited
federal power. It is more likely a world where that impulse had not yet been
given expression and force in a modern Supreme Court decision. Discourses
evolve, and sometimes hallowed maxims disappear. But while they live,
they can be mobilized. And sometimes they lie about like loaded weapons.
Lopez dissipated our constitutional culture’s discursive pressure to vindicate the enumerated powers maxim. Not entirely, of course—some people
who recognize that the individual mandate is within the commerce power
under present doctrine continue to worry that the Court is not giving the
enumerated powers maxim its full due. 13 But one or two examples of taking
the maxim seriously do infinitely more to allay that worry than zero examples would. Just as importantly, Lopez set in motion a process of commonlaw refinement that by 2006 produced an articulate framework for upholding pervasive federal regulation. Forced to live in the modern world, Lopez
begot Raich, and Raich makes upholding the individual mandate easy. Stated differently, Raich requires the Court to work hard to explain why the
mandate is unconstitutional, whereas before Raich greater effort would have
been required to show that the mandate was valid. And the burden of cognitive effort can matter a great deal, especially when combined with a Court’s
inclination to go one way or another in the first place.
In his dissent in Lopez, Justice David Souter wrote that it would be a
mistake to think of the decision rendered that day as a minor development in
13.

See e.g., Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 549–66 (Sutton, J., concurring in part).
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the law. It is sometimes the case, he wrote, that one does not realize how
important a decision will become until years later, when one sees the course
on which that decision set the law. At a certain level of generality, Justice
Souter’s observation is surely correct. But Justice Souter’s point was that
Lopez could be the beginning of a large rollback of the commerce power,
one that could imperil the world of federal regulation in which his generation had always lived. So far, that has not come to pass. Instead, one of the
most consequential effects of Lopez may be the development of a more stable rubric for upholding comprehensive federal regulation—a rubric that has
more or less by accident taken shape just in time to preserve one of the most
ambitious federal laws in American history.

